Co-Location and Convergence of Public Utility Easements by Black, Alexander J.
Law and Business Review of the Americas
Volume 5 | Number 2 Article 9
1999
Co-Location and Convergence of Public Utility
Easements
Alexander J. Black
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law and Business
Review of the Americas by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alexander J. Black, Co-Location and Convergence of Public Utility Easements, 5 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 292 (1999)
https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra/vol5/iss2/9
292 NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas




II. Canada's "Convergence Report?'
A. RE-REGULATION AND COMMODITIZATION.
B. CO-LOCATION: COMPELLING ACCESS TO SUPPORT STRUCTURES.
III. Eminent Domain and Stewardship of Utility Easements.
A. LEGISLATION & EASEMENT DEED BOILERPLATE.
B. MULTIPLE-PIPELINES AND "CROSSING REGULATIONS."
IV. Administrators of the Incorporeal Right of Way.
V. Co-location and Burdens on Servient Land.
A. INTERFERENCE WITH "ACQUIRED RIGHTS."
B. VALUING THE EASEMENT UPON A SECOND TAKING.
C. ZONING, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC UTILITY LAW.
VI. Evolution Versus Revolutionary Use of Easements in the United States.
VII. Sharing the Hegemony: NAFTA & Telecom Competition.
VII. Conclusion.
I. Introduction.
In Greek mythology, Stentor was the herald in the Trojan War with the voice of ten
men. In Canada, a stentorian call is being made for the efficient use of public utility ease-
ments. This article describes the economically efficient and legally permitted uses of ease-
ments for natural gas pipelines and other types of utilities. It discusses the inclusion of
fiber-optic cable on a pipeline right-of-way and the multiple use or access to the support
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structures of other utility easements. Indeed, the process of co-location of essential utility
services is being driven by the convergence of market forces and technological advance-
ment in North America.
Accordingly, a developing legal doctrine is challenging the conventional common law
conceptions of private property use and public law stewardship of utilities. For instance,
federally regulated pipelines in Canada have the legislative power to operate telecommu-
nications systems, such as fiber optics, on their rights-of-way for their own use. The eco-
nomic efficiency thesis of this new legal doctrine means that they may operate telecom-
munications for commercial use. Under this nascent doctrine, public utilities are admin-
istrators of their easements, having a wider range of public utility land use rights than
was previously thought possible.
Increasingly, the issue in Canada is less what right a utility has over its easements;
rather, the issue is the extent that third parties have a right to compel a utility to grant
them access to the utility's easement support-structures. Co-location of fiber optics on a
pipeline is an economic and allocative efficient use of property. As the Canadian utility
sector deregulates and re-regulates, the compelling issue therefore concerns the rights of
third-party users of the utility easements. And as administrators of their easements, utili-
ties allocate access to essential services. This allocation process involves a question of con-
struction of the enabling legislation. It also concerns construction of tortuous easement
deeds, whether they contemplate use that was or was not necessarily contemplated at the
time of grant.
The extent of these correlative rights has only been alluded to by the National Energy
Board of Canada (NEB), the tribunal charged with stewardship over inter-provincial and
international pipelines and electricity transmission systems. While the NEB has consid-
ered the issue of multiple use of rights-of-way in relation to the routing of new pipeline
facilities, it has not yet properly addressed the issues of co-location and convergence.
Therefore, some analogy may be made to the Canadian Radio-television and
Telecommunication Commission (CRTC) and its policy of access to utility support struc-
tures. In the energy industry, modern telecommunications technology could be used to
move forward to real-time1 pricing and make valve control responses more efficient in
the face of potential incidents. Since the cost of installing a single strand of fiber sufficient
for a pipeline's needs is not marginally different than installing multiple strands, the
unused ("dark fiber") capacity has valuable potential. For instance, in 1985, the Williams
Pipeline Co. installed 11,000 miles of fiber-optic cable inside its unused pipelines, aided
by a small plastic device invented to pull fiber through pipelines without excavations.
Nine years later, Williams sold its network service operations for $2.5 billion.2
This article concerns the efficient use of pipeline easements and identifies the new legal
doctrine of co-location. It explains the present lacunae in the law due to an unreconciled ten-
sion between public law regulation of utilities and the private nature of easements. It also
attempts to reconcile this tension, suggesting that pre-existing utility has a right and obliga-
1. Real-time databases are, by definition, updated continuously. Real-time processing involves
instantaneous implementation of the desired changes in the database. Examples of real-time
databases familiar to the legal community are Quicklaw, Westlaw and LEXIS-NEXIS.
2. Andrew C. Barrette, Tilting Toward Telephony: How Electric and Gas Companies Can Leverage
Their Systems for a Changing Market, 33 NO. 11 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 26 (1995).
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tion of stewardship over its easement. For example, when railways came into existence, a gen-
eral legal rule developed, called the "Junior-Senior Rule" 3 where the newcomer had to com-
pensate the existing utility for the costs of crossing. The old Board of Railway
Commissioners accordingly based their decision in ordering a crossing agreement since this
was less intrusive or offensive to the proprietary interest of the senior utility.
As public (or administrative) law developed in Great Britain and Canada from the
1920s, statutory tribunals like the NEB developed their own peculiar policies in order to
meet the needs of the industry served. These statutory tribunals have implemented leg-
islative regulations to govern the manner and form of utility crossings. These tribunals
have also made decisions themselves or interpreted court decisions concerning the use of
utility easements. However, these disparate decisions have never been reconciled with the
common law property rights of easement. Instead of the present pernicious practice of
compartmentalization, regulators and courts ought to harmonize the rules concerning
public utility stewardship of easements.
II. Canada's "Convergence Report:'
In the United States, electric utilities are increasingly diversifying into the local and
long distance communication market. In Canada, action has been less pronounced due in
part to a slower pace of industrial change and a relative lack of competition in the commu-
nications market. This is changing as local utilities must go this route in order to survive.
New developments are occurring in automatic meter reading, wireless phone systems,
remote terminal units, and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. For
example, UTILiNK is a business that installs dark (or unused fiber-optic cable4) throughout
the electric utilities jurisdiction and a one-time connection from the providers "point-of-
presence" (POP), which is otherwise usually found at the outskirts of a city where the
municipality connects with long distance phone companies like AT&T and Sprint. The util-
ity can then access a middleman helping the telecommunications provider reach businesses
and households via the utilities-owned fiber system. In an era of increased competition,
customers are more likely to stay loyal to their utility provider if it can provide them with a
wider range of services, including local phone and Internet service. At the same time, these
utility providers could use these revenues to lower the cost of their principal services and
enhance competitiveness in the North American marketplace.5
3. See, e.g., St. Eugene de Guigues v. C.P.R. [19371 S.C.R. 451.
4. M. Moss, New Fibers of Urban Economic Development, 4 PORTFOLIO: A Q. REV. TRADE & TRANSP.
11-18 (1991). Long distance communications systems increasingly use fiber-optic wires. These
have several advantages over traditional copper wire: large carrying capacity, high speed, more
security, and higher signal strength. Fiber systems tend to connect major communications hubs
because they are not easily spliced and hence not desirable for connecting multiple lateral sites.
Fiber systems tend to be installed along existing rights-of-way, whether rail, water or highways.
Id. The growing use of fiber-optic systems thus tends to strengthen the major existing telecom-
munication concentrations and therefore the existing hierarchies.
5. Michael McMillan, Toronto Company Bridges the Gap Between Utilities and Fibre Optic
Technology, ELECTRICiTY TODAY, Oct. 1997.
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Part of the public utility policy justification for co-location is from the CRTC's
Convergence Report. 6 The CRTC proposed that "measures be developed to ensure that all
telephone and cable subscribers have the freedom to connect the inside wire to the sys-
tems of whichever suppliers of service they choose."7 The CRTC stated that the perceived
need for transitional protection of the core cable business stems essentially from concerns
about the market power of the telephone companies and any head start they may obtain
in packaging telephony and entertainment. The CRTC set out proposed measures, 8 which
would permit the customer to acquire and own the inside wire used to receive broadcast-
ing services. Indeed, the Government's Convergence Policy Statement 9 stated that the
objective is towards implementing competition in local telephony by establishing a
framework for interconnection, unbundling, co-location, rate restructuring, and interim
number portability.'0
Furthermore, in order to be effective and efficient, interconnection between the local
telecommunications facilities of Canadian carriers should allow customers of one local
service provider to complete calls to customers of another local service provider in a
transparent fashion. The unbundling of the incumbent telephone company's local net-
work makes certain telephone company facilities available for competitors' use. Efficient
interconnection and an appropriate degree of unbundling are both important for the
successful implementation of competition in local telephony.'' Use of pipeline easements
for fiber-optic telecommunication is technically possible and economically practical.
More importantly, such use is consistent with the process of utility re-regulation.
A. RE-REGULATION AND COMMODITIZATION.
Commoditization of telecom, natural gas, and electricity transportation involves the
evolution of a property right. It is a relatively new expression reflecting public utilities that
are increasingly competitive and that require re-regulation. They are so competitive that
deregulation is warranted because a fully functioning market offers the best protection to all
participants. Commodities are specialized objects available to be exchanged; they are fungi-
ble. Most people think of commodities as being physical objects like pork bellies traded on
the stock market, or rights such as warrants, yet the provision of services have characteristics
of a commodity. 12 Increased choice in the provision of essential public services means that
providers are not unique, and that another can be an effective substitute.
Like the sale of generic prescription medicines, there is a terminal commoditization
of electricity and natural gas transportation where further exchange is precluded by law.
6. Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission [hereinafter CRTC], Report
to the Government entitled Competition and Culture on Canada's Information Highway [here-
inafter Convergence Report], (May 19, 1995).
7. Id.
8. Public Notice CRTC 1997-25.
9. Id. (citing Government's Convergence Policy Statement (Aug. 6, 1996)).
10. Id.
11. Applications by Telephone Companies to Carry on Broadcasting Distribution Undertakings,
Broadcasting Public Notice CRTC 1997-49 (May 1, 1997).
12. Indeed, "[elducation is a commodity, like Pepsi-Cola or alligator shoes, and freedom is a privi-
lege fully available only to those who can afford it." LEWIS H. LAPHAM, MONEY AND CLASS IN
AMERICA 22 (1988).
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For instance, the publicly recognized commoditization of natural gas prices operates in
conflict with complex schemes for valuation of gas transportation prices, and interest
groups. The NEB directly regulates this conflict as opposed to the indirect regulation pro-
vided to the general economy by antitrust authorities. The former type of economic regu-
lation tries to maintain the conditions and not the results of competition by prohibiting
certain undesirable forms of conduct. Conversely, direct regulation is flawed, perhaps
more so than competition tempered by antitrust oversight because it relies on the judg-
ment of non-industry participants-the NEB-to make decisions as surrogates for the mar-
ketplace. The over-regulation of an industry also shifts scarce resources away from activi-
ties that increase competition, productivity and innovation, and capital investment.
Assessing the effectiveness of regulation recognizes that both the regulatee and the
regulator go through different stages of growth and development-a growth cycle. These
include its beginning, its youth, where social responsibility strongly favored ratepayers. It
seems somewhere between maturity, as regulatory effectiveness peaks, and now old age,
where it is faced with difficult choices of imperfect regulation and imperfect re-regula-
tion. 13 A corollary is that different theories of regulation have different merits at different
stages of the life cycle. This article advocates that changes in the marketplace require reg-
ulatory changes to accommodate the efficient use of utility easements so as to promote
the commoditization of essential utility services.
B. CO-LOCATION: COMPELLING ACCESS TO SUPPORT STRUCTURES.
Parliament has recognized the need for a scheme of co-location, making such provi-
sion in the Telecommunications Act 14 in order to facilitate competition in that industry.
Although the CRTC has decided in favor of a policy of interconnection, unbundling, and
co-location, it is struggling to implement this policy. In particular, the CRTC has consid-
ered 15 Access to Rights-of-Way and Support Structures saying that "[rnights-of-way and
similar arrangements allow carriers to construct, maintain and operate transmission
structures and cables on public and private property."16 Some parties went further, sub-
mitting that access to rights-of-way and other similar arrangements should be considered
as essential facilities.17
The Commission noted that the Telecommunications Act provides a comprehensive
framework for the provision of access to public and private property, including support
structures. For instance, § 43(5), Access by others, provides that:
Where a person who provides services to the public cannot, on terms accept-
able to that person, gain access to the supporting structure of a transmission
line constructed on a highway or other public place, that person may apply to
the Commission for a right of access to the supporting structure for the pur-
pose of providing such services and the Commission may grant the permis-
sion subject to any conditions that the Commission determines.18
13. See JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITIES RATES 556 (2d ed. 1992).
14. S.C. 1993.
15. Local Competition, Telecom Decision CRTC 97-8, Canadian Radio-Television and
Telecommunications Commission, May 1, 1997.
16. Id. at 117.
17. Id.
18. Telecommunications Act 1993, § 43(5).
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Ostensibly, once an owner of a private transmission facility provides telecommunications
services to the public for compensation, it would become a telecommunications common
carrier and be liable to provide access to others, on fair commercial terms, to its support-
ing structure. Parliament defined telecommunications common carrier as a person who
owns or operates a transmission facility (first criterion) used by that person or another
person to provide telecommunications services (second criterion) to the public for com-
pensation (third criterion). 19 Public Telecommunications Transport Services (Telcos) is
one example of the common carrier or public switch telephone provider of basic ser-
vices20 referred to in the Act. Consequently, resellers 2 1 who do not have basic transmis-
sion facilities should not be subject to Commission regulation.
While, as the Canadian Cable Television Association (CCTA) noted, access to existing
private rights-of-way will be subject to the terms of the original licence granting such
rights-of-way, all Local Exchange Carriers (LECs) will have the ability to negotiate new
public and private rights-of-way and other arrangements. 22 Where negotiations fail to
achieve access by a LEC to private or public property on suitable terms and conditions,
the Telecommunications Act provides a framework by which such access might be
obtained. In light of these considerations, the CRTC considers that access to rights-of-way
and similar arrangements should not be treated as essential facilities, and that no specific
access to such arrangements should be mandated at this time.
Co-location refers to the rates, terms, and conditions under which competitors of the
incumbent telephone company may terminate their facilities at the telephone company's
central offices. Co-location refers to an arrangement whereby customers of the telephone
company can terminate their own transmission facilities in the telephone company's cen-
tral office. Physical co-location allows competitors to physically terminate transmission
facilities in the telephone company's central office. Virtual co-location allows competitors
to terminate facilities at a point outside the central office, but in all material aspects pro-
vides the same service at the same rate as would physical co-location.2 3 Thus, the CRTC's
Convergence Report 24 called for "measures [to] be developed to ensure that all telephone
and cable subscribers have the freedom to connect the inside wire to the systems of
whichever suppliers of service they choose." In order to help implement this freedom of
connection, the CRTC encourages 25 the cable and telephone industries to explore cooper-
ative opportunities for the shared use of network infrastructures, particularly where this
may be key to building the information highway in smaller markets in Canada.
More recently, the Convergence Policy Statement 26 concluded that, with regard to the
wiring inside a consumer's premises, "the objective should be to ensure that consumer
19. Id. § 2(1).
20. Increasingly, Telecom providers must have regard to the Broadcasting Act because of the
increased "virtual reality" interaction of data.
21. Exemption of Resellers from Regulation, Telecom Public Notice CRTC 93-62, Canadian Radio-
Television and Telecommunications Commission, Oct. 4,1993.
22. Id. at 118.
23. Regulatory Framework Co-location, Telecom Public Notice CRTC 95-13, Mar. 20, 1995 [here-
inafter Co-location Notice].
24. Convergence Report, supra note 6.
25. Public Notice CRTC 1993-74.
26. Convergence Policy Statement of Aug. 6, 1996, supra note 9 (citing Public Notice CRTC 1997-25).
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choice is not limited but rather gives the consumer the ability to obtain services from any
combination of suppliers they choose, without unnecessary inconvenience." This pro-
motes the idea behind comparably efficient interconnection (CEI). CEI is another term
used to refer to arrangements whereby competitors are provided with access to the local
network that is equivalent or comparable to that provided to the telephone company's
competitive services. CEI requires that the telephone companies unbundle the compo-
nents of the local network used to provide access to its long distance services and make
these components available to competitors. 27 As competition and convergence intensifies
in the utility industry, litigation may shape the extent of physical co-location.
This shaping process will have to recognize that Canadian public utility tribunals
have previously considered the matter and have indeed authorized it. In Ottawa
Cablevision, Ltd. et al. and Bell Canada,28 a cable company was denied the joint use of
Bell Canada's poles or conduits. The tribunal lamented the need for up-to-date legislation
to regulate the development and provision of service and facilities by all telecommunica-
tions carriers. 29 Three years later, the Canadian Transport Commission (CTC) appeared
to reverse itself.
Unable to obtain permission directly from Bell Canada, in 1975, Transvision sought
leave from the CTC to carry certain cables across or near the structure of Bell Canada in
the Magog area of Quebec. The CTC noted that Bell was incorporated with authority to
construct, erect, and maintain its lines, wires, and poles along the side of, across, or under
highways or other public places, provided that Bell did not interfere with the public right
of traveling on or using such highways.30 Furthermore, the CTC stated:
We believe that when one devotes one's property to a use in which the public
has an interest, one, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and
must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the
extent of the interest created. 31
Transvision held a CRTC licence to provide a CATV service and sought to place
cables or wires of the type covered by section 317 of the Railway Act near the lines or
wires of Bell. The CTC's only reasonable and practical way of effectuating this was by
means of attachment to Bell's poles located in that area. Accordingly, the CTC ordered
that Bell permit Transvision to affix the cable subject to an annual per pole rental charge
as compensation to be agreed upon between the parties for the use of pole space. Failing
agreement, the CTC would decide the matter of compensation. 32
In British Columbia Telephone Co. v. Shaw Cable Systems (B.C.), Ltd.,33 a labor arbi-
tration board found that BC Tel was in violation of its collective agreement with TWU
when it permitted cable companies to install cables on BC Tel's support structure. At the
time of its decision, the CRTC clearly had the jurisdiction to require telephone companies
to allow cable companies to use their support structure, and, by virtue of §§ 335 and 340
27. Telecommunications Act, C.R.C., CRTC 94-19 (1994) (Can.).
28. [1973] CTC 522 Canadian Transport Commission.
29. See id. at 538.
30. Transvision (Magog), Inc. v. Bell Canada, [19751 CTC 463.
31. Id. at 485.
32. Id. at 486.
33. [1995] S.C.R. 739,125 D.L.R. (4th) 443, 183 N.R. 184 (S.C.C.).
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of the old Railway Act,34 to regulate the terms of support structure agreements (SSAs)
between the telephone companies and cable companies. Therefore, the Supreme Court of
Canada upheld the decision of the CRTC.
The CRTC also had jurisdiction to determine which company, the cable company or
the telephone company, would be responsible for the installation of a cable company's
facilities on the telephone company's support structure. This jurisdiction was held to be a
natural extension of the CRTC's jurisdiction to regulate tolls and tariffs. "Indeed, the
determination of who is responsible for the installation of the cable facilities is a neces-
sary component of the regulation of the prices charged by the telephone companies for
cable company access to their support structure. ' 35 The Supreme Court of Canada also
held that a strong element of curial deference should be given to decisions of the CRTC.36
Ontario Hydro v. UMG Cable Telecommunications, Inc.37 was a proceeding heard by the
Federal Court of Appeals in May 1998. In that proceeding, Ontario Hydro appealed a deci-
sion of the CRTC, averring that the CRTC erred in holding that the words "transmission
line" in § 43(5) of the Telecommunications Act included transmission lines that are used to
distribute electrical power. Hydro submitted inter alia that the CRTC erred in holding that
the support structures contemplated by this provision include the supporting structures
owned and operated by provincially regulated public utilities like the applicant. At issue was
whether the CRTC exceeded its jurisdiction by applying § 43(5) to the applicant. 38
Under its provincial enabling legislation, Ontario Hydro "may contract with any corpo-
ration, firm or person for joint ownership or joint use of works or for rights to use the
works.. '" and for the purposes of this subsection "works" include telephone and telegraph
lines and other communication works.39 Hydro suggested that the intent of § 43(5) was to
provide a remedy for a person who provides a public service and cannot gain access to the
distribution facilities of a telecommunications company that is within the jurisdiction of
the commission, and that this remedy is not available against electrical utilities.
In Ontario,40 the CRTC held that "supporting structure" as referred to in § 43(5) of
'the Telecommunications Act includes the supporting structures owned and operated by
provincially regulated public utilities such as Ontario Hydro.4 1 One of the reasons pro-
vided by the CRTC was that given the public interest in the telecommunications industry,
this section should be read as including electrical utilities. The CRTC outlined the issues
relating to the joint use of support structures that were addressed by the local networks
convergence committee as early as 1991. According to the committee's report, the sharing
of the electrical power utilities support structures will benefit society economically, envi-
ronmentally, and esthetically. 42 According to the CRTC, in order to promote the orderly
34. RailwayAct, R.S.C. ch. R-3, §§ 335(l) 1985, [rep. &sub.1991,c. 11,s. 861,340 [am. 1991,c. 11,s. 871.
35. Id. per C.J. LAMER, at para. 38, p. 49 81, DB SCJ (Quicklaw report).
36. British Columbia Tel. Co. v. Shaw Cable Sys. (B.C.), Ltd. [1995 S.C.R. 739, 125 D.L.R. (4th) 443,
at 454, 183 N.R. 184 (Justice UHeureux-Dub6).
37. Memorandum of Applicant, Ontario Hydro v. UMG Cable Telecomm., Inc., (F.C. 1997) (file
A332-97).
38. See id.
39. Power Corporation Act, R.S.O., c.p.8 § 44(3) (1990) (Can.).
40. See id.
41. CRTC decision on Application for Interim Relief dated Mar. 27, 1997, file: 4760-215(L), page 22.
42. Id. at 18-19.
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development of the telecommunications system in Canada, this provision should be given
a broad interpretation to include supporting structures of electrical transmission lines. 43
Accordingly, the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed Ontario Hydro's application for
leave to appeal from the interlocutory decision of the CRTC. This decision appears to fol-
low foreign litigation and has far-reaching implications for public utilities. For instance,
the First District Court of Appeal held that under Florida law, telephone and telegraph
companies have the power of eminent domain to place fiber-optic cable underground
within the rights-of-way of railroads without obtaining permission from, or paying com-
pensation to, the underlying landowners. The court reasoned that there has been a nexus
between railroad and commercial telegraph facilities throughout the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. 44
Some see mandatory access regulations as creating a perennial right of content con-
trol through the one-time grant of a public right-of-way in the government. 45 U.S. com-
mentators say, ironically, that mandatory access laws that force telecommunication com-
panies to be the mouthpieces of others are required by the First Amendment. Proposed
mandatory access laws could burden telecommunication entities with prohibitously high
costs. On the other hand, such companies may not be able to build rapidly a comprehen-
sive and advanced information infrastructure if they do not receive a return on their
investment. Yet builders of these new networks will use real public property for laying
copper wires, coaxial cable, and fiber-optic cable, and will use previously unused electro-
magnetic frequencies. The obligation to reserve capacity is arguably a reasonable quid pro
quo for the right to use available public rights-of-way.
To some extent, the public has a right to demand compensation in the form of public
access to such networks by entities that provide substantial benefits to the public. 46
Convergence of two energy sources, natural gas and electricity, may eventually include
other products, such as water, telecommunications, energy management, and meter read-
ing. Convergence increases the range of financial services offered to customers, provides
them with services that meet their specific needs, and gives them more for their money.
Energy has become a traded commodity, and trade elicits innovation requiring accom-
modation by the regulatory regime.
III. Eminent Domain and Stewardship of Utility Easements.
This section attempts to provide a theoretical basis for the creation of a new doctrine
of public utility easements, contemplating co-location, and reconciling correlative rights.
In order to reconcile the tension between the private law nature of easement deeds and
public law based utility regulation, it is necessary to describe their interrelation. Because
43. Id. at 12.
44. Paul Stephen Kimsey, Eminent domain: Florida statutes, section 362.02 gives telephone companies
the power of eminent domain to place fiber optic cable underground on land where railroads have
rights-of-way without obtaining permission from or paying compensation to land-owner. Davis v.
MCI Telecomm. Corp., 606 S.W.2d. 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), 23 STETsON L. REv. 565 (1994).
45. See Andrew D. Auerbach, Mandatory Access and the Information Infrastructure, 3 COMM. LAW
CONSPEcrus 1, 10 n.102 (1994).
46. See id.; citing Congressional debates, H.R. REP. No. 367, 103D CONG., 2D SESS. 13.
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easements are an incident of common law, there is a general tendency of the common law
to decide the case first and determine the principal afterwards. Often lawyers see how
they ought to decide on a given state of facts without being very clear as to the ratio deci-
dendi.47 Only after a series of determinations on the same subject matter does it become
necessary to reconcile the cases by a true induction, a principle that has until then been
obscurely felt. This initial reconciliation is typically modified more than once by new
decisions before the general rule takes it final shape. Indeed, a "well-settled legal doctrine
embodies the work of many minds, and has been tested in form as well as substance by
trained critics whose practical interest is to resist it at every step "' 48
However, public utility stewardship involves a strong dose of administrative law. In
settling the new legal doctrine concerning public utility easements, it helps to remember
that the common law had, until relatively recently in its history, an antipathy towards
administrative law. In England, and by persuasive precedent proxy in Canada, a false con-
clusion existed that there could be no administrative law without a separate system of
administrative courts. 49 Until as late as the 1930s, conservative English judges congratu-
lated themselves on a system of common law that avoided the perceived inadequacies of
the civilian French droit administrative.50
Accordingly, the unreconciled tension between the common law of easement and the
public law concerning utility regulation is reflected as late as 1920 in Canada.
The term 'expropriation' is a somewhat new one in the literature of the law.
Sweets Law Dictionary (ed. 1882) says: 'The term has been introduced from
foreign countries to denote a compulsory purchase of land, etc., for the pur-
pose of a railway, canal, or the like (expropriation pour cause d'utilitiM
publique) ... 'Eminent Domain' is the term used by which the American
courts and text writers designate the right of the State to acquire property in
invitum and as it is now finding its way into the English law dictionaries (e.g.
Wharton's Law Lexicon by Aggs, 1911) there seems to be no reason why it
should not come into general use in Canada instead of the practice of using
the obscure term 'expropriation' as a synonym for it. 51
This definition of Eminent Domain has a connotation that suggests the paramountcy
of the greater public good involved in a taking of private lands. In Canada, the newfan-
gled term of Eminent Domain mysteriously lost favor among commentators and jurists
in the mid 1920s, yet continues vibrantly in the United States.
47. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, AM. L. REV., I, 5; reprinted in HARV. L. REV. (Mar. 1931).
48. Id.
49. See generally, 0. HOOD PHILLIPS & PAUL JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 32
(7th ed. 1987).
50. Id. See also Lord Hewart of Bury, The New Despotism 37 (2d ed. 1945) who asserts that admin-
istrative law is "substantially the opposite of" the "rule of law." Id. The author also states that
"happily there is no English name for administrative law." Toward the end of the 1920s the orga-
nized bar in England became especially antagonistic toward administrative agencies. See also
Lord Hewart, The New Despotism; Cmnd. 4060 (1932) Report of the Committee on Ministers
Powers.
51. Editor's Note, Compensation - Construction, Canadian Railway Cases, Vol. XXIV at 441 (1920).
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One reason was an antipathy of the common law to the threatening encroachment
of administrative law. Another possible reason for the loss from use of the term
Eminent Domain in Canadian jurisprudence is that this term reveals the political
nature of taking lands for a public purpose. Indeed, the nature of the decision to expro-
priate is essentially political. 52
The Minister ... having deemed it advisable to expropriate, has exercised his
statutory discretion and the Court has no jurisdiction to sit on appeal or in
review of such decision. That it cannot go back on that decision is a legal tru-
ism. These questions are political in their nature and not judicial. 51
"The courts cannot inquire into the motives which actuate the authorities or into the
propriety of their decision."54 Hence, the popular term expropriation masks the political
nature of taking private lands for a public cause. Canadian courts are sluggish in induct-
ing a rational doctrine of public utility easements by their failure to investigate the full
dynamic of utility easement acquisition and stewardship.
In fact, common law practice is supposed to derive a few ideas from close attention to
the facts presented via induction, empirically building up a coherent body of case-law
jurisprudence. However, the empirical construction of a coherent body of case-law
jurisprudence is stunted by an inopportune compartmentalization, which militates
against this process. A misguided tension seemingly exists between the private law of
easement and the public law of utility stewardship akin to a fear that messing around
with the current artificial system will result in a collapse of property law. The law of real
property is not that dissimilar than 18th century England, "a fine artificial system, full of
unseen connections and nice dependencies: and he that breaks one link of the chain,
endangers the dissolution of the whole."55 Pending the rational reconciliation of this ten-
sion, statutory tribunals may be overstepping their jurisdiction, receiving too much defer-
ence from common law courts. Until then, the old forms of property law will inhibit the
efficient public utility regulation of essential services as they evolve in this age of inter-
connection and convergence.56
52. See Favor v. Winnipeg (City) [ 1998] 51 D.L.R. 4th 344 Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench, Jewers
J., Manitoba Judgments: [1988 M.J. No. 46 (Quicklaw) 1, at 20-21.
53. See id. citing Lewis on Eminent Domain, § 239.
54. Favor, approving the dicta of J. Audette, in The King v. Halifax Graving Dock Co. Ltd. (1920) 56
D.L.R. 21, at 25, 20 Ex. C.R. 44, at 58.
55. Per J. Blackstone, Perrin v. Blake, in IF. Hargrave, TRACTs RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND 489,
498 (1787).
56. Quaere: Under the framework of the forms of action (or formulary) system, a plaintiff who
sought relief in the common law courts had to state a case in accordance with one of a limited
number of standard forms. Maitland said: "English law knows a certain number of forms of
action, each with its own uncouth name.... The choice is not merely a choice between a number
of queer technical terms, it is a choice between methods of procedure adapted to cases of differ-
ent kinds .... The forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us from their graves." (F.
Maitland, THE FoRMs OF AcrION AT COMMON LAW 2 (1962)).
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A. LEGISLATION & EASEMENT DEED BOILERPLATE.
A pipeline right-of-way is an easement,57 yet the nominal classification is unhelpful
unless the functional purpose is clarified in a contemporary context. In other words, the
ambit of a public utility easement has to be construed with reference to the utility's enabling
legislation and the easement deed boilerplate. 58 Thus, a right-of-way is an incorporeal
hereditament. Furthermore, easements of way typically exist where the owner of fee simple
property expressly grants a specific right of user. Her land is called the servient tenement
and the right conveyed to the grantee is known as the dominant tenement. If a grantee
(owner of the servient tenement) exceeds the use prescribed in the deed granting the right-
of-way (excessive user), then sanctions are available to restrain this use. Strictly speaking, a
person who makes an excessive use of a servient tenement in purported exercise of a right-
of-way commits a trespass. 59 However, the action of trespass is ephemeral to the extent that
the servient tenement is sterilized under principals of public utility stewardship. Nor can
the grantee of a right-of-way enlarge the privilege conveyed by the grant.60
For instance, the habbendum clause6' of the easement deeds for principal federal
Canadian gas pipelines contemplates pipeline use including things "useful in connection
with or incidental to its undertaking." In particular the rights granted to a pipeline usual-
ly include:
the exclusive right, license, liberty, privilege and easement on, over, upon,
across, along, in, under and through the strip of the lands of the Transferor ..
. to lay down, construct, operate, maintain, inspect, patrol (including aerial
patrol), alter, relocate, remove, replace, reconstruct and repair a line of pipe
together with all the facilities or works of the Transferee". . . "useful in con-
nection with or incidental to its undertaking including, but without limiting
the generality of the foregoing, all such pipes, drips, valves, fittings, connec-
tions, meters, cathodic protection to the foregoing as may be useful or conve-
nient in connection therewith or incidental thereto, for the carriage, con-
veyance, transportation and handling of natural gas... "62
57. See generally, Bruce Ziff, The Acceptance and Limits of Possessory Easements, 3 R.P.R. (2d) 129
(1989) (involved is Husky Oil v. Shelf Holdings). The Alberta Court of Appeal states that "it
appears that the Court of Appeal has moved beyond considering simply whether the easement
confers possession or joint possession on the grantee, to the broader and more appropriate func-
tional consideration of whether the easement interferes to an unacceptable extent with the rights
of use and occupation of the servient owner. Minimally, the Court is indicating that possessory
easements are not invalid per se. Easements must enhance the utility of the dominant land, but
this cannot be at the expense of sterilizing the servient tenement; the law should strive to create a
proper balance." Id.
58. 'Boilerplate' is colloquialism referring to terms borrowed from other contracts. This phrase
stemmed from the turn of the century in New York City when some low-overhead telephone
salesmen literally took up offices in basements next to boilers. Their transactions were of a recur-
ring nature and some actually named certain clauses after the manufacturer's name on the boil-
erplates.
59. See Milner's Safe Co., Ltd. v. Great Northern and City Ry. Co. 190711 ch. 208,228.
60. See Bridgman v. Loblaw's Groceterias Co., Ltd. (1929) 35 OWN 353 (HC), aff'd 36 OWN 214 (SC
App. Div).
61. That part of a deed setting out the amount of the interest conveyed.
62. As expressed in a typical proforma deed of TransCanada Pipelines Limited.
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These words are words of inclusion, not words of exclusion. The onus would be on an
opponent to prove otherwise, perhaps by arguing ambiguity and the contra proferntum rule.
However, the word pipeline is widely defined in the NEB Act.6 3 This statute is a pri-
mary aid to interpretation. Under this provision, a pipeline includes "interstation systems
of communication by telephone, telegraph, or radio,' namely:
a line that is used or to be used for the transmission of oil or gas [or any other
commodity,] connecting a province with any other province or provinces, or
extending beyond the limits of a province or the offshore area as defined in
section 123, and includes all branches, extensions, tanks, reservoirs, storage
facilities, pumps, racks, compressors, loading facilities, interstation systems of
communication by telephone, telegraph or radio and real and personal prop-
erty and works connected therewith; but does not include a sewer or a water
pipeline that is used or proposed to be used solely for municipal purposes. 64
This statutory definition must be read conjunctively with the express grant in the
easement deed. It also must be read together with Parliament's intent in providing utili-
ties with discretion over stewardship of their easements.
B. MULTIPLE-PIPELINES AND "CROSSING REGULATIONS."
The NEB policy on multiple use of existing utility corridors is terse and pertains to
routing criteria. "[T]he principal route selection criterion of TransCanada, namely the
advantage associated with the multiple-use of existing utility corridors, is well recognized
by the Board. The rights of affected landowners, however, must not be ignored ... "65 In
other words, the Board appears amenable to the efficiencies of co-location, yet does not
have the jurisdiction to decide upon issues concerning substantive property rights. This is
the jurisdiction of common law courts.
Indeed, the NEB has interpreted that only single line rights may be obtained unless
an easement agreement provides otherwise. 6 6 The NEB Act 86(2)(e) states:
A company may not acquire lands for a pipeline under a land acquisition agree-
ment unless the agreement includes provision for restricting the use of the
lands to the line or pipe or other facility for which the lands are by the agree-
ment specified to be required unless the owner of the lands consents to any pro-
posed additional use at the time of the proposed additional use, and .... 67
63. See National Energy Board Act R.S.C., c. N-6, s.1 (1985) [hereinafter NEB Act] (definition as by
Canada Transportation Act, S.C. (1996)).
64. Id. For instance, a standard form easement deed for the Alberta Natural Gas Company (ANG)
goes further saying "without limiting the generality of the foregoing, all. . . other equipment and
appurtenances ... as may be useful or convenient in connection with or incidental to the under-
taking of the Company... Id. Another Canadian pipeline, albeit provincially located and reg-
ulated (Nova, An Alberta Corporation), has a proforma easement deed similar to the ANG's.
65. National Energy Board, Reasons for Recission GH-1-89 (TCPL Facilities Vol II, Dec. 1989), at 129,
affirming the Board policy in National Energy Board, Reasons for Recission GH-2-87, at 129.
66. See GH-4-90, Phase 1 Pt. 1, Kingston - Oct. 17, 1990, Transcript.
67. NEB Act §§ 87, 88-103 (Negotiation and Arbitration), § 104 (Right of Entry) 1983 amendment
to the NEB Act.
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This curious provision stems from an amendment Act in 1981.68 The effect of the
amendment has contributed to the unreconciled tension between easement rights and
public utility regulation. According to travaux prdparatoire69 as shown by the legislative
debate in the Canadian Senate, this section was intended to guard against a pipeline
exceeding the number of lines contemplated in its easement. 70
Although the NEB has held that land acquisition is a matter between the landowner
and the company, the NEB does not approve the right-of-way agreement that results from
negotiations. Nevertheless, the NEB ensures that the agreement complies with the Act: 71
The Act, in addition to requiring consent for additional future use in para-
graph 86(2)(e), also contains provisions which provide for negotiation or
arbitration if the landowner and the company cannot agree on the amount of
compensation payable (sections 88 to 103). It is clear that Parliament intend-
ed that consent and compensation be dealt with in a distinct manner...
However .... the Agreement must specifically state that consent is required at
the time of any additional use rather than stating only that compensation
must be agreed upon at that time. 72
It is a matter of interpretation whether an easement agreement contemplates multi-
ple line use. In any event, landowners may consent in advance to such use. Although the
NEB purports not to approve right-of-way agreements, it disingenuously does so when
ensuring that the agreement complies with the Telecommunications Act. In addition to
the co-location of fiber optics on utility easement, the practice concerning conventional
multiple line use is ripe for restatement.
Under the National Energy Board Act, 73 leave of the NEB is generally required to
construct a facility across a pipeline. However, the Pipeline Crossing Regulations74 have
delegated this decision making to the individual pipeline. Indeed, these regulations are
part of a broader trend towards so-called lighter-handed regulation, a general retreat
away from dirigiste or command and control public utility regulation. These regulations
prescribe 75 the Conditions and Circumstances under Which Leave of the Board is not
Required to construct a facility. Thus, a facility is defined to include:
68. See Bill C-60 Act to amend the National Energy BoardAct, § 74(2)(e).
69. See Senate Special Committee on the North Pipeline, 32nd Parliament, 1st Sess., (1981).
70. See id. at 12:26, per Mr. Stewart "I think that the intent of this section is to limit the company's
rights to what was planned in the first place and not come along later and say, 'Mr. Farmer, we
have an easement; we are going to put another line in, or '[wle are going to dig up four places
and put in four valves."'
71. See Intercoastal Pipe Line, Inc. and Interprovincial Pipe Line, Inc., GH-4-93, National Energy
Board Decision dated Apr. 1994, at p. 55-56.
72. OH-1-97 Amoco Canada Petroleum Company, Ltd. on behalf of Dome Kerrobert Pipeline, Ltd.
and Pan Canadian Kerrobert Pipeline, Ltd., National Energy Board Decision dated July 1997, at
15.
73. NEBAct § 122.
74. National Energy Board Pipeline Crossing Regulations, pt. I, SOR/88-528, no amendments since
1997/03/19. This information is consolidated in the NEB's "Excavation and Construction Near
Pipelines" Jan. 1997, located on the National Energy Board of Canada Internet web site.
75. NEB Act § 4.
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any structure that is constructed or placed on the right-of-way of a pipeline,
and (b) any highway, private road, railway, irrigation ditch, drain, drainage
system, sewer, dike, telegraph, telephone line or line for the transmission of
hydrocarbons, power or any other substance that is or is to be carried across,
along, upon or under any pipeline. 76
In other words, these set out the circumstances under which a pipeline may consent
to crossings. Federally regulated pipelines in Canada have the legislative authority to per-
mit third-party commercial use of their rights-of-way, providing it is done safely and on
prudent commercial terms. However, the extent of this right has not been judicially nor
otherwise critically examined. The following places the issues of crossing arrangements
and the corollary of incidental user of easements in historical context.
IV. Administrators of the Incorporeal Right-of-Way.
Pipelines in Canada have the right to operate fiber-optic telecommunications for its
own use and for incidental third-party commercial use. The latter right follows the
Supreme Court of Canada's decision in C.P.R. v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (1889)77
where a railway company
had as incident to and necessary for the safe operation of the road the right and
power to erect a line of telegraph, and had the exclusive right to do so along
their line of railway, and having themselves such exclusive right I can see no
reason why they should not confer such exclusive right and other privileges
mentioned in the contract whereby they were enabled to secure ample tele-
graphic services for the operation of the road, instead of erecting and equip-
ping a line of telegraph for themselves.78
It was further held that a railway company that had made such a contract had the
power to bind by it any company to which the railway was subsequently assigned. 79
Although this decision concerned the railway legislation, the principle for which it stands
is incorporated in the regulations controlling pipeline crossings.
A pipeline's right-of-way is already devoted to public or semi-public uses. The enabling
legislation contemplates and accommodates other utilities by empowering a federally regu-
lated pipeline to enter into crossing agreements. Federally regulated pipelines have been dele-
gated the authority to conclude agreements if a telephone or electricity utility, or indeed
another pipeline, needs to cross and/or run along within their right-of-way. The practical
consequence of this delegated authority is that a federally regulated pipeline is effectively the
administrator of the incorporeal right of public passage within its easement.
The concept of administrator of the incorporeal right of public passage 80 has been
76. See id.
77. See Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co. [1889] 17 S.C.R. 151.
78. Id. at 158.
79. See Great North-Western Tel. Co. v. Montreal Tel. Co. [1888] 20 S.C.R. 170. COYNE, THE RAILWAY
LAW OF CANADA 498 (1947).
80. See generally, Alexander J. Black, Establishing Public Rights of Passage, J. L. So'v SCOTLAND 158,
159 (Apr. 1991) (citing Stewarty Dairy Association, Ltd. v. Kirkcudbright Town Council 1956 SC
488, 1956 SLT 341,499).
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used in Scotland in situations where a property developer has constructed a road, intend-
ed for public use, but the road has not yet formally entered into the local government's
list of public roads. By implication, the pipeline is steward of the easement for the public
interest in an essential facility. For instance, in Stewarty Dairy Assoc. v. Kirkcudbright
Mags.,8 1 public powers regulating roadways were provided for in the Burgh Police
(Scotland) Act, 1903, which was a statutory predecessor of the 1984 Roads (Scotland)
Act. 82 In the Court of Session, Lord MacKintosh said:
By reason of the vesting the Town Council acquired no rights of property
which they did not have before, but they became the administrators of the
incorporeal right of public passage over the highway or street in question and
were given powers under the Burgh Police Acts, including rating powers to
enable them adequately to discharge their duties as such administrators. 83
In this Scottish case, the local roads authority became the administrators of the incorpo-
real right of public passage over a road when it is entered into the public register of roads.
The conceptual distinction here is between a public right of passage and a public road. In the
context of a federally regulated pipeline, the pipeline company is the administrator of the
easement, a function bolstered by the delegation to it of crossing responsibility.
The genesis of the NEB Crossing Regulations is the General Order 490 of the Board
of Railway Commissioners, dated February 20, 1931. This order approved Standard
Conditions and Specifications for Wire Crossings to be constructed along or across rail-
ways within the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada. The jurisdiction of the
Board to make such an order was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada as early as
1932 in Canadian Electrical Association v. C.N.R.84 This decision was likewise affirmed by
the Judicial Committee of Privy Council. Lord Blanesburgh, referring to an earlier deci-
sion on the purpose of crossings said:
[R]ailways stretching as they do over the whole country, of necessity must be
crossed from time to time by innumerable telephone and telegraph wires, and
to a lesser extent by the wires of electrical power and light companies. ... All
public utilities must be served, railways not more than others ... the issue on
every application must always be how the crossing can properly and safely be
made in the particular circumstances of the case under consideration. 85
Each case for a utility crossing must address the technical specifications and physical con-
struction of the crossing. Likewise, the person seeking the crossing must pay for the construc-
tion and invariably, a fee to the pipeline. "The only points to be considered then are whether
such telephone connection will be of public benefit, and if so, what terms should be imposed
81. See Stewarty Dairy, 1956 SC 488, 1956 SLT 341.
82. See id.
83. Id. at 499 SC; following Galbreath v. Armour (1845) 4 Bell's App. 374; RANKIN ON
LANDOWNERSHIP 325 (4th ed. 1980).
84. 39 Canadian Railway Cases 296 [193213 D.L.R. 118, [19321 S.C.R. 451, aff'dby the Privy Council
42 Canadian Railway Cases 162 [193414 D.L.R., A.C. 551.
85. Id. at 166 (approving an earlier Board of Railway Commissioners decision, Maritime Telegraph &
Telephone Co. v. Dominion Atlantic Railway Co. (1916) 20 Canadian Railway Cases 213).
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on the telephone company seeking the privilege "' 86 In this sense, the utility granting the cross-
ing is the administrator of the incorporeal right of public passage within its easement.
Prior to the crossing regulations, early decisions of the Board of Railway
Commissioners (whose successor is the Canadian Transportation Agency) discussed the
public stewardship of utility crossings. The practice of the Board was to allow the right-
of-way of railway companies to be crossed by the construction overhead or underground
of lines of wires or water-pipes without compensation. The Board's order merely creates
an easement, which can be canceled or varied as occasion may require from time to
time.87 This time-honored practice continues. The difference is that the prerogative is
delegated to a pipeline under the Crossing Regulations. 88
Where the Board is called upon to deal with a situation by order and the
question of right to compensation in respect of overhead crossings, or the
construction of under-crossings by the lines or wires of electrical transmis-
sion wires, or water-pipes, or sewers, or anything of the kind arises, it is not
the practice of the Board to grant compensation to the railway whose proper-
ty rights are by such order affected. At best, an easement is obtained and the
Board has refused to order any charge by way of compensation where a mere-
ly technical violation of property rights is involved. 89
The initial policy of the railways recognized the necessity of these crossings;
and in cases where no injury was done to the railway company, it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to determine the compensation, if any, which
should be awarded the company for the stringing of wire at such a height over
its right-of-way as not to, in the slightest degree, interfere with the railway use
or occupation. The practice of the Board has been to allow such crossings with-
out compensation. The railway is not in any way injured by them. The order
merely creates an easement which can be canceled or varied should occasion
from time to time require it.90
86. Peoples' and Caledon Tel. Cos. v. Grand Trunk and Canadian Pac. Ry. Cos., 9 Canadian Railway
Cases 161 (1909) Bd. of Railway Commissioners, at 162 (per Assistant Chief Commissioner
D'Arcy Scott). Under § 245 of the Railway Act, the former Board of Railway Commissioners was
empowered to grant an order under such terms as it deemed fit, compelling railway companies to
permit the installation and maintenance in railway stations of telephones.
87. See Maritime Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Dominion At. Ry. Co. and Baird v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co. 20
Canadian Railway Cases 213 (1916) Bd. of Railway Commissioners.
88. Id. (referring to National Energy Board Pipeline Crossing Regulations).
89. Id. (per The Chief Commissioner, Sir Henry L. Drayton, K.C., at 216-17).
90. Id (per Commissioner McLean, at 214, " [as the Railway Act stands, it is not necessary for the Board
to issue an order in the case of wires being carried over or under a railway or water-pipes or other
pipes being carried under the railway, where the work is done with the consent of the railway and in
accordance with the general regulations of the Board.") The sections involved, viz, 7 and 8 of 1-2
Geo.V. ch. 22, do not state whether payment for crossing the right-of-way may be properly charged,
but as they stand there is nothing to prevent this being a term of the consent, and if the parties are in
agreement the Board is not called to intervene. Baird was applied in A. Demers, LaPrairie v. Grand
Trunk Ry. Co. 31 Canadian Railway Cases 297 (1920) Bd. of Railway Commissioners.
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Following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in C.P.R. v. Western Union
Telegraph Co.,9 1 federally regulated Canadian pipelines have incidental power to use its
right-of-way and fiber-optic telecommunications for commercial purposes. Even in the
absence of this authority, it would be impossible to assess damages claimed by the
servient tenement. It would be absurd to allow a claim for Mesne Profits, namely those
derived from the land when possession has been withheld improperly.
A fortiori, the pipeline crossing regulations allow installation of telecommunications
wires across or along the right-of-way. These regulations represent the public policy in
delegating stewardship of the right-of-way to the pipeline company. The pipeline is best
suited to assess these day-to-day needs as administrator of the incorporeal hereditament
of way. Furthermore, according to C.PR. v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,9 2 the Supreme
Court of Canada views telecommunications as a valid incident of public utility provision.
The Pipeline Crossing regulations legislatively implements this prerogative. These author-
ities buttress ancient presumptions in favor of the utility owning a right-of-way. For
example, the servient tenement is typically a fee simple estate in land, and the pipeline
itself has an estate in land in the nature of an easement running with the land. The prac-
tice is to grant the easement rights by deed, hence, a presumption of general user exists in
favor of the dominant tenement. Indeed, the court will always presume that a person
using another's land is a licensee, not a trespasser.
93
V. Co-location and Burdens on Servient Land.
It is not an absolute issue whether fiber-optic installation or other incidental use on a
pipeline easement is undue or wrongful burden on the land of the servient tenement.
Rather, the issue is one of threshold. Although the adjoining landowner(s) own the solum
of the right-of-way, the right-of-way is sterilized since their ability to use it is extremely
limited. Indeed, ownership of the right-of-way solum (the land under the right-of-way)
by the servient tenement is somewhat fictional since the proprietor has scant control over
its use. Lord Watson in the Privy Council described this relativism.
The tunnel has become pars soli in the strictest sense of the words. If it had
been constructed by one who was a proprietor a centro usque ad coelum, it
would have passed, in the absence of exception, with his conveyance of the
land. As the matters stand the owners of the soil, whoever these may be, are
practically divested of interest in that part of it which has been converted into
tunnel. They have no right to occupy or to interfere with it in any way what-
ever; their exclusion is not for a period limited, but for all time coming.94
91. SeeNEBAct§ 89.
92. See id.
93. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co. v. Gutherie [19161 1 C.R.C. 161, 31 S.C.R. 155; Micklethwaite v. Vincent,
[ 1920] 8 Time L.R. 685 (applied).
94. Re Interprovincial Pipe Line Co. [1951] 128 C.R.T.C. 135 (cited with approval from the obiter
dicta of Lord Watson in Metropolitan R. Co. v. Fowler [ 1893] A.C. 416,425.
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In other words, de minimis non curat lex (the law doesn't concern itself with triviali-
ties). For example, in Classic Communications, Ltd. v. Lascar,95 the defendants purchased a
property that was subject to a registered easement in favor of Hydro to maintain its poles
and cables. The plaintiff was a provider of cable that had obtained permission from
Hydro to attach its cable to the Hydro poles. Subsequently, the defendants tried to force
the plaintiff to remove its cable. In the action heard by Justice Pennell, the plaintiff asked
for a declaration that an easement or an irrevocable license existed in its favor. The court
held that the plaintiff had a right to attach its cable to the Hydro poles so long as Hydro
maintained such poles. The decision was based on the plaintiffs having established that
an equity existed in its favor. The plaintiff had incurred expense in the belief that its right
to continue to use the Hydro poles would be continuing or quasi-permanent, and there
was a negligible resultant burden on the land.
Subsequent obiter dicta recognized the evolutionary nature of a utility easement yet
left undefined the parameters of permissible evolution. In Hillside Farms, Ltd. v. British
Columbia Hydro & Power Authority,96 an agreement, made through negotiation and arbi-
tration, was phrased in general terms, and was silent as to the specifics regarding size,
location, and design of lines and towers to be added in the future. In holding for the utili-
ty the court accepted that:
It was logical that as technology progressed the requirements of transmission
lines would be modified. Therefore a general grant of right-of-way could not
be limited to the original use, as long as future uses were of the same general
nature .... I am driven to the conclusion that the negotiators of the agreement
were striving to provide a power line right-of-way which would be appropri-
ate and valid in perpetuity and which would accommodate upward modifica-
tions of user.97
Unfortunately, the case law becomes split as judges try to distinguish between quanti-
tative and qualitative increases in use, while uncritically relying upon an eighteenth cen-
tury paradigm of property law. For instance, in Descar, Ltd. et al. v. Megaventures Corp. et
al.,98 it was argued by the defendant that the change from one door to three doors on the
north side of the plaintiffs' premises was an increase in the burden of the alleged ease-
ment and accordingly created a new starting point for the twenty-year period for a pre-
scriptive easement. The predecessor court to the Ontario Court of Justice (General
Division) stated that it is not the number of doors, but the use of the defendant's land
that matters. Although cases of prescriptive easement have their own peculiarities, the
court followed high authority9 9 for the view that a mere increase in the number of times
a way is used, as opposed to a change in the type of use or in the character of the domi-
nant tenement, is not a change in the burden.
95. Classic Communications, Ltd. v. Lascar [19851, 36 R.P.R. 186 (Ont. H.C.) (followed in Rogers
Cable TV Ltd. v. 373041 Ontario, Ltd., [1996] O.J. No. 2033).
96. Hillside Farms, Ltd. v. British Columbia Hydro & Power Authority [ 19771 3 W.W.R.
97. Id. (per Carrothers, J.A., at 753).
98. Descar, Ltd. et al. v. Megaventures Corp. etal. [1990] 72 O.R. (2d) 388.
99. British Rys. Bd. v. Glass, [19651 1 Ch. 538, 562.
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A. INTERFERENCE WITH "ACQUIRED RIGHTS."
Another pernicious aspect of the unreconciled tension between private-law-based
easement and public-law-based utility regulation is the effect of the latter on a utilities'
proprietary rights. Generally speaking, the fact that the implementation of the power of
the NEB will affect property and civil rights is no objection to the validity of the
Telecommunications Act.100 Yet it is trite law that an act cannot retroactively confiscate
acquired rights without express wording. Indeed, it is a fundamental rule of English Law
that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a con-
struction appears very clearly in the terms of the act, or arises by necessary and distinct
implication. 10 1
Mr. Justice Dickson, in Gustavson Drilling (1964), Ltd. v. Minister of National
Revenue, 102 reiterated the presumption against retrospective interference with vested
rights: "The rule is that a statute should not be given a construction that would impair
existing rights as regards person or property unless the language in which it is couched
requires such a construction: Spooner Oils, Ltd. v. Turner Valley Gas Conservation
Board."103 The presumption that vested rights are not affected unless the intention of the
legislature is clear applies whether the legislation is retrospective or prospective in opera-
tion. 104 At bottom, Spooner Oils does not impose substantive restrictions on provincial
authority in the natural resources area. The decision, in effect, conditions the manner in
which provincial authority may be exercised. 105 While contractual rights may be altered
"ab extra by the force of the law" 106 the legislative intent to alter the terms of existing
licenses must be "manifested by unavoidable inference."'1 7 Similarly, the right to unilater-
ally alter the terms of a Crown lease must be explicitly reserved in the lease.
Furthermore, in Attorney General for Alberta v. Majestic Mines, Ltd.,108 a unanimous
Supreme Court of Canada again declared the principle that a legislative act in derogation
of 109 contractual rights must be stated in clear and precise terms. In Majestic Mines, the
100. Northern & Cent. Gas Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General) [ 19711 4 W.W.R. 413.
101. See MAXWELL, THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 215 (1980) (under the heading Retrospective
Operation of Statutes); see also ReAthlumney [18981 2 Q.B. 547, 67 L.J.Q.B. 935). Perhaps no rule
of construction is more firmly established than this-that a retrospective operation is not to be
given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation.
102. Gustavson Drilling (1964), Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue ( 19751 29 D.T.C. 5451.
103. Spooner Oils, Ltd. v. Turner Valley Gas Conservation Bd. [ 19331 S.C.R. 629,638.
104. A. J. Black, Comparative Licensing Aspects of Canadian & United Kingdom Petroleum Law, TEX.
INT'L L.J. 471,475 (1986).
105. Roland Harrison, The Legal Character of Petroleum Licences, 58 CAN. BAR. REv. 483,487-91.
106. Dugal v. Lefesure (1933] 4 D.L.R. 552.
107. Id. at 552-56.
108. Attorney General for Alberta v. Majestic Mines, Ltd. [ 19421 S.C.R. 402.
109. Id. at 405. The enforceability of an express variable royalty clause was confirmed in Attorney
General for Alberta v. Huggard Assets, Ltd. [19531 A.C. 420. In that case, a royalty clause in a fed-
eral Crown patent provided for royalty payment "upon the said petroleum and natural gas, if any,
from time to time prescribed by regulations.' Id. at 433. Although no royalty rates were in effect
at the time of the grant, the privy Council opined that the words "from time to time" sufficiently
incorporated future royalty regulations. Id. at 436. A variable royal clause was also upheld in the
context of quarrying licenses in Attorney General of British Columbia v. Deeks Sand & Gravel Co.,
Ltd. [19561 S.C.R. 336.
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plaintiff held a Crown surface and mineral patent executed in 1908. The habendum
clause of the patent provided that the patentee would yield to the Crown a royalty "if any
prescribed" by regulations of the Lieutenant Governor in Council. The court held that the
phrase "if any prescribed" did not refer to the future. If the Crown intends to reserve the
right to impose future royalties, such "reservations must be expressly stated."" 0
B. VALUING THE EASEMENT UPON A SECOND TAKING.
In Nova v. Will Farms, Ltd.,11 a subsequent taking of an existing pipeline easement
only availed the owner of the servient tenement to a token award. Diminution of value to
the reversion was not proven. In 1965, Nova obtained a right of entry order1 12 and built a
pipeline having paid compensation to the owner of the land. Twelve years later, Nova
obtained a second right of entry order and The Surface Rights Board of Alberta made an
award of compensation. The issue was the value of the interest lost in the land that was
already subject to an existing entry order. The Alberta Court of Appeal held that there was
no reduction in consequence of the second entry as the existing occupational rights of the
owner were only marginally affected.
One of the rights remaining with the owner of the servient tenement is the
reversion. 113 Mr. Justice Kerans succinctly described the matter1 14 as concerning the
"characterization and valuation of the property interest lost on a subsequent entry" say-
ing that "the value of further diminution of the claimant's ownership interest is negligible
and a token award would be appropriate' Indeed, there is no law requiring a pipeline to
pay a fee to landowners for its pipeline. The matter is compensatory. No adverse conse-
quences occur to the reversion unless the second pipeline survives the first. As said in
Dome Petroleum, Ltd. v. Hampson:
If the pipe line located in the right-of-way by the third taking [this was a third
taking] is no longer required by the appellant at a time when either first or
second pipe lines are still being used, then the respondents' reversionary inter-
est in the land is not affected at all by the current taking. If, on the other hand,
pipe lines 1 and 2 are no longer required by the appellants but pipe line 3 is
still required, then it is seen that it is the interest acquired from the respon-
dents on the present taking that prevents the fee simple in the right-of-way
from reverting to the respondents. If that is the case, then the interest taken
does affect the respondents' residual interest in the right-of-way .... 115
The onus of diminution in value of the reversion rests with the owner of the servient
tenement. This follows the reasoning applied from the Ontario Court of Appeal, 116 which
110. Majestic Mines [19421 S.C.R. at 405.
111. Nova v. Will Farms, Ltd. [ 19811 22 R.P.R. 67.
112. Pursuant to the Surface Rights Act, ch. 91, (1972) (Can.).
113. See Re Cochin Pipelines, Ltd. v. Rattray [1981] 1 W.W.R. 732, sub nom. Rattray v. Cochin
Pipelines, Ltd., 27 A.R. 32, 117 D.L.R. (3d) 442. The leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada was dismissed 27 D.L.R. 359.
114. Nova [19811 22 R.P.R. 67.
115. Dome Petroleum, Ltd. v. Hampson [1981110 Alta. L.R. 2d 140,144; 19 A.R. 257.
116. Murphy Oil Co. v. Dau [1969] 70 W.W.R. 339,7 D.L.R. 3d 512,530 [varied, (1970) S.C.R. 861,73
W.W.R. 269, 12 D.L.R. 3d 191 (where McDermid J.A. notes: In re Interprovincial Pipe Line Co.
[19551 O.W.N. 301, at 305).
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said that in valuing an easement, "the proper approach to valuation of the easement taken
was first to find the value to the owner of the fee simple at the date of expropriation, then
find the residual value in the 60-foot strip after expropriation and, by deducting the latter
from the former, arrive at the value to the owner of the easement taken." Accordingly, it is
axiomatic that the person subject to expropriation is entitled to have such value and its
decrease determined on the basis of the most advantageous use, whether present or
prospective, to which its property could have been put immediately prior to the enact-
ment of the Regulations. 117
C. ZONING, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC UTILITY LAW.
Classical conceptions about public utilities are premised upon the notion that they
are monopolies, which are the opposite of markets that enjoy perfect competition or the
optimum efficiency brought about by competitive behavior and performance. In a free
market system, competition benefits consumers by eliciting an efficient distribution of
resources amongst individuals thereby inhibiting the skewed realization of profits by a
business without rivals.
[I]t has been the law for centuries that a man may set up a business in a coun-
try town too small to support more than one, although he expects and
intends thereby to ruin someone already there, and succeeds in his intent. In
such a case he is not held to act 'unlawfully and without justifiable cause' ...
The reason of course is that the doctrine generally has been accepted that free
competition is worth more to society than it costs, and that on this ground
the infliction of damage is privileged. 118
Yet utility regulators have to move beyond the classical view of natural monopoly" 19
as expressed in the seminal Atlantic Seaboard120 case where it was said that "[Tihe high
fixed costs and immobility of pipeline facilities are economic characteristics of the natur-
al gas industry precluding the sort of competition expected as a norm elsewhere in the
economy."12 1 This classical statement is no longer the case in a world of interconnection,
convergence, and co-location.
117. Ramey v. Canada [1987] 1 F.C. 552.
118. Oliver Wendell Holmes quoted in SILAS BENT, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 181 (1932); 167
Mass. 103,104-08.
119. E. GELLHORN & R.J. PIERCE, REGULATED INDUSTRIES IN A NUTSHELL 19-44 (2d ed. 1987). JAMES C.
BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 11 (1961).
The familiar statement that a public utility is a "natural monopoly" is meant to indicate
that this type of business, by virtue of its inherent technical characteristics rather than by
virtue of any legal restrictions or financial power, cannot be operated with efficiency and
economy unless it enjoys a monopoly of its market. So great are the diseconomies of
direct competition that, even if it gets an effective start, the competition will probably
not long persist if only because it will lead to the bankruptcy of the rivals. But even if
competition is long lived, as has occasionally happened when rivalry has taken a
restrained form, it is wasteful of resources because it involves unnecessary duplication of
tracks, of cables, of substations, etc.
Id.
120. Atlantic Seaboard Corp. v. EP.C., 404 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
121. AMERICAN GAS ASSOCIATION, COMPETITION IN THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY, Energy Analysis (1984).
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As suggested earlier, the commoditization and reregulation of essential utility ser-
vices is being driven by the marketplace. Public choice requires that the phenomenon of
interconnection, convergence, and co-location be considered with regard to economic
policy and political institutions.122 Contemporary stewardship of utilities must eschew
unwarranted or unsubstantiated interference with business transactions. Indeed, excessive
governmental regulation is suspect.
The kind of situation which economists are prone to consider as requiring
corrective governmental action is, in fact, often the result of government
action. Such action is not necessarily unwise. But there is a real danger that
extensive governmental intervention in the economic system may lead to the
protection of those responsible for harmful effects being carried too far. 123
Accordingly, a reconciliation of the tension between private law easement construc-
tion and public utility regulation should accept the fact that utility regulators exercise
land-use planning related functions. For example, zoning is a form of legislative and exec-
utive action, which finds its counterpart in many community developments. Sometimes
the action taken leads to a right to compensation and sometimes it does not. That ques-
tion is to be resolved according to the applicable statutes adopted by the legislature.
Zoning illustrates the process. Ordinarily, in Canada, the United States, and the United
Kingdom, compensation does not follow zoning either up or down. 124
However, it has been said, at least in some U.S. courts, that a taker may not, through
the device of zoning, depress the value of property as a prelude to compulsory taking of
the property for a public purpose.1 25 This principle was applied in Canada as long ago as
1913 by the Ontario Court of Appeal:
It is, of course, accepted law that the value of the land to the expropriating
body cannot be included as an element in the compensation. But, on the
other hand, that authority ought not to be able, by the exercise of its other
powers immediately prior to the taking, to reduce the value of what it seeks
and intends to acquire and of which it is contemplating expropriation. 126
When measuring the amount of money that the owner of expropriated property
should receive as the equivalent in value of the property taken from him, it is just as
important to ensure that the Crown is not required to pay more for it than it was worth
as it is to make sure that its owner receives its fair value. The duty of determining the
122. "Public choice" is sometimes used interchangeably with the "economic theory of legislation." See
R. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REv. 339 (1988). The legislative process is part
of the market process: "legislation is good demanded and supplied much as other goods, so that
legislative protection flows to those groups that derive the greatest value from it, regardless of
overall social welfare." Richard Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the
Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 265 (1982).
123. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 I.L. & ECON. 1, 133 (1960), reprinted in RONALD
COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAw 95-156 (1988). Coase was awarded the 1991 Nobel
Prize in economics, partially for his contribution to ideas in law and economics that allocation of
property rights may have little effect on the ultimate use of property. Id.
124. See The Queen v. Tener [1985] 1 S.C.R. 533.
125. See id.; see also 4 NICHOLS' THE LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN 12-627, $12.322 (revised 3d ed. 1973).
126. See In re Gibson v. City of Toronto [1913] 28 O.L.R. 20, 28.
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equivalence in money of the value of the expropriated property demands fairness to the
expropriating public as well as to the owner of the property. An excessive award is a
breach of this duty. It is anachronistic to apply the philosophy that the compulsory taking
of property is in the nature of trespass to modern conditions where individuals are expro-
priated for public purposes. There is no element of tort or delict in an expropriation
under the Expropriation Act. 127
This analysis appears to have been tacitly followed in a recent telecom case. In Bell
Canada v. Unitel Communications, Inc.,128 the Federal Court of Appeal considered 129
whether the CRTC erred in law or exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering the appellant
companies to interconnect their telecommunications networks with Unitel and other
proposed competitors without ordering compensation. The court distinguished an early
precedent concerning interconnection rights, particularly the use of the term expropria-
tion.1 30 Indeed, the Federal Court of Appeal stated that "[it is fundamentally erroneous
to characterize as an 'expropriation' an order of a regulatory tribunal requiring the con-
struction of facilities by a regulated company:' 13 1
Thus, planning partly attempts to resolve market failure problems through compre-
hensive policy making for land use on the community level. A physical plan is the transla-
tion of values into scheme. Invariably, the aggregate gains of a planning choice cannot be
demonstrated. This is because the planner's redistributive values are assumed to be supe-
rior to those of the market and will result in a net gain to the aggregate welfare.1 32 To say
that the regulator of a public utility cannot contemplate land use planning criteria in its
decisions is an abrogation of its public service duty, not to mention a conceited compart-
mentalization of responsibility.
Planning is generally defined as "deciding in advance what to do:' yet to do so ratio-
nally.1 33 Yet the conundrum for public utility regulators is a staging process where the
provision of necessary services is achieved before development. However, it is difficult to
create staged controls since the provision of public services and facilities is often delegat-
ed to authorities operating independent of the planning and land-use regulation sys-
tem. 134 In the United States, energy facilities and transmission lines have siting problems
pitting state against local government, and the case law concerning preemption of juris-
diction is mixed.1 35
127. The Queen v. Supertest Petroleum Corp., Ltd. [1954] Ex. C.R. 105.
128. Bell Canada v. Unitel Communications, Inc. [19931 1 F.C. 669.
129. An issue pertaining to the now repealed National Telecommunications Powers and Procedures
Act, R.S.C., ch. N-20 (1985) (Can.).
130. Ingersoll Tel. Co. v. The Bell Tel. Co. of Canada [19161 53 S.C.R. 583.
131. See Bell Canada [19931 1 F.C. 669.
132. DANIEL R. MANDELKER & ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT:
CASES AND MATERIALS 12-14 (2d ed. 1990).
133. See id.
134. See id. at 611.
135. See id. at 780.
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VI. Evolution Versus Revolutionary Use of Easements
in the United States.
A secondary easement is the term used in the United States to incidents like the ease-
ment holder's rights to maintain and improve an easement. If details about secondary
easements are not spelled out, the general principle is that "reasonable" uses are permit-
ted. 136 What is reasonable depends upon the surrounding circumstances, most impor-
tantly, in the case of an easement appurtenant, the activities that one might be expected
to conduct on the dominant tenement. When the creating language is general, an appur-
tenant easement may be used to support not only the activities conducted on the domi-
nant tenement at the time of creation, but to a certain extent, future activities. Perhaps
the best formula is that the purposes may keep up with those changes that might be rea-
sonably anticipated for the dominant tenement-evolutionary not revolutionary. 137 For
instance, a general passway easement permits gradually changing uses, to correspond
with normal changes in modes of transportation and normal development of the domi-
nant tenement.
138
Along this line, a leading Canadian commentator 139 stresses the policy issues guiding
the interpretation of easements. According to the well-known dictum in Dyce v. Lady
Hay "The Category of servitudes and easements must alter and expand with the changes
that take place in the circumstances of mankind."'140 This strongly suggests that although
fiber optics were not contemplated when the deeds were granted, Canadian pipelines
have the right to use the right-of-way to an extent that exceeded what was contemplated
at the time of the grant, provided it doesn't interfere unreasonably with the enjoyment of
the like right by others. 141
The next point is that courts take notice of the commercial setting when construing
136. CUNNINGHAM, STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 458 (2d ed. 1993).
137. See id. at 459 (citing Peterson v. Friedman, 162 Cal. App. 2d 245, 328 P.2d 264 (1958); Birdsey v.
Kosienski, 140 Conn. 403, 101 A.2d 274 (Conn. 1953); Camron v. Barton, 272 S.W.2d 40 (Ky.
1954)). Much interest has focused recently on the "rails to trails" question: when a railroad
abandons a rail line, may its "railroad" easement be used as a recreational trail? Is a recreational
trail within the scope of a railroad easement? Courts are divided on this issue. See e.g.,
Washington Wildlife Preservation, Inc. v. Minn. Dept. of Natural Resources, 329 N.W.2d 543
(Minn. 1983), cert. denied 463 U.S. 1209, 103 S. Ct. 3540, 77 L.Ed. 2d 1390 (1983) (yes); Lawson v.
State, 107 Wash. 2d 444, 730 P.2d 1308 (1986) (no); In Presault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n
494 U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 914, 108 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990), the U.S. Supreme Court avoided answering the
issue, though they held that if the trail was not within the scope, compulsory conversion would
be a taking.
138. See Birdsey, 140 Conn. at 403; Camron, 272 S.W.2d at 40; see also Miller v. Street, 663 S.W.2d 797
(Tenn. App.1983) (right to take water from spring, originally by bucket, could change to allow
piping of water).
139. ANGER & HONSBERGER, REAL PROPERTY 926 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing the reason for prohibiting an
easement in gross).
140. Dyce v. Lady Hay [ 18521 1 Macq. 305 (H.L.).
141. SeeJelbertv. Davis [19681 1 All ER 1182, [19681 1 W.L.R. 589.
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contracts or deeds. 142 What distinguishes a public utility corporation from any other
business corporation is dedication of its property or plant to providing utility service to
the public on nondiscriminatory terms in its territory of service. When these deeds were
concluded and registered years ago, the pipeline business was different, characterized by
bundled services with non-transparent pricing terms. Hence, it is unlikely that a mono-
lithic, unchanging pipeline industry was contemplated at that time.
Unlike Canada, the United States constitutionally protects property rights from tak-
ings. 143 In both countries, compensation is due from expropriation for public purposes, a
process popularly referred to in the United States as eminent domain. Under Texas law, 144
a railroad could grant a telecommunications company an easement for installation of
fiber-optic cable beneath the railroad's right-of-way without compensating the owner of
the subservient estate; the right-of-way surface included the non-mineral top soil that
would be occupied by a buried fiber-optic line, and the fiber-optic cable was an autho-
rized incidental use which was not inconsistent with railroad uses and did not burden the
subservient estate. Telephone, telegraph, and interurban lines are public facilities that are
contemplated by the grant of a railroad right-of-way and, thus, do not constitute an addi-
tional servitude; rather, the grant in such use is to the public and the public makes use of
it. The incidental use doctrine allows railroads to contract with third parties and controls
the permissible scope of railroad authorized right-of-way uses and allows third-party
commercial uses of the railroad right-of-way.
Earlier, in 1988, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that a fiber-optic cable constructed in
an easement dedicated to a natural gas pipeline represented a use of property sufficiently
inconsistent with the original purpose of the easement to constitute a taking of property. The
142. See Reardon Smith Line, Ltd. v. Hansen Tangen [1976] 3 All ER 570, 574, 576. Quoting Lord
Willberforce:
No contracts are made in a vacuum: there is always a setting in which they have to be
placed. The nature of what is legitimate to have regard to is usually described as 'the sur-
rounding circumstances' but this phrase is imprecise: it can be illustrated but hardly
defined. In a commercial contract it is certainly right that the court should know the
commercial purpose of the contract and this in turn presupposes knowledge of the gene-
sis of the transaction, the background, the context, the market in which the parties are
operating.
This statement was adopted by Laycraft J.A. of the Alberta Court of Appeal in Bank of B.C. v.
Turbo Resources, Ltd. (1983) 27 Alta. L.R. (2d) 23, B.L.R. 152, 148 D.L.R. (3d) 598,46 A.R. 22, 29.
143. Public utilities have traditionally relied on eminent domain to obtain easements and public
rights-of-way necessary for the provision of public utility service. Such takings of private proper-
ty must be supported by a valid public use, from which a direct public benefit will be derived.
144. See Mellon v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. & MCI, 750 F. Supp. 226 (D. Tex. 1990). Railroad grant-
ed a telecommunications company an easement for installation of cable beneath the railroad's
right-of-way without compensating owner of subservient estate. Owner of subservient estate
brought suit alleging an abuse of right-of-way, trespass to try title, inverse condemnation and
conversion, and unjust enrichment. Defendants brought motion for summary judgment. The
District Court, Bunton, C.J., held that: (1) railroad could grant the company an easement with-
out compensating the owner of the subservient estate; (2) under Texas law, company could have
secured an easement from railroad pursuant to condemnation statute; and (3) federal law
impliedly occupies entire field so as to preclude any application of state law relating to railroad
right-of-ways. Id.
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taking was authorized, however, because (1) the owner of the cable was held to be a tele-
phone corporation entitled to exercise eminent domain, and (2) the taking was held neces-
sary to serve a public purpose. The state court affirmed lower court findings that the trans-
mission of communications through fiber-optic technology qualified as a transmission of
communications by electrical current, which met a necessary condition for the exercise of
eminent domain by telephone corporations. Moreover, the fiber-optic cable served a public
purpose because it would become part of an interstate system already capable of transmit-
ting communications among several large cities. It was not necessary, the court explained, to
prove a direct benefit to a sizable and identifiable segment of the public. 145
In Bell Atlantic Telephone Cos. v. FCC,146 the District of Columbia Circuit slowed the
development of the much-heralded information superhighway by invalidating the FCC order
mandating physical co-location on a public utility.147 The phrase public utility generally
includes a privately-owned corporation that performs a public service, such as providing
energy, electricity, or telephone services to customers.1 48 A public utility often has a monopoly
or near monopoly in the market where it sells its public services. Public utilities also have
extensive and unique operating facilities that are very difficult and expensive for a competitor
to replicate. Commentators suggest that a regulator effects a taking when the regulator orders
a public utility to give a competitor access to a discrete part of the public utility's physical
property in furtherance of legitimate regulatory goals. Generally, where the government as a
regulator mandates physical access to a landowner's property, courts find that a taking 149 has
occurred in violation of the Fifth or Fourteenth1 50 Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
When a taking occurs, the Constitution requires the government to provide just compensa-
tion to the landowner. Courts generally have construed "just compensation" to be the "fair
market value"'51 of the property "taken" as of the time the taking occurred.152
145. See Williams Telecomm. Co. v. Gragg, 750 P.2d 398 (Kan. 1988).
146. Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
147. Physical collocation involves the placement of competitor's equipment in the local telephone
companies' central offices. See also Alexander C. Larson & Douglas R. Mudd, Collocations and
Telecommunications Policy: A Fostering of Competition on the Merits?, 28 CAL. W. L. Rev. 263
(1992). This placement facilitates the competitor's access to the information superhighway by
reducing the costs of interconnection between the networks of local telephone companies and
their competitors. See Alexander C. Larson et al., Competitive Access Issues and
Telecommunications Regulatory Policy, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 419 (1994).
148. See Leonard M. Baynes, A Derailment on the Information Superhighway: Desperately Seeking to
Avoid Paying Compensation-A Case Study of Special Access Collocation and its Invalidation in Bell
Ati. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 24 E3d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1994), 21 U. DAYTON L. REv. 417, n.8 (1996).
149. See id. at 416; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S. Ct.
3164 (1982).
150. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "[No] State [shall] deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
151. See BONBRIGHT, supra note 13, arguing that the market for part of public utility property is often a
monopoly market rather than a competitive market. As such, the fair market value would
accordingly be a monopoly price.
152. See United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123, 70 S. Ct. 547, 549 (1950).
Courts and commentators have frequently suggested that the just compensation clause was
included in the Bill of Rights to prohibit unfair distribution of the costs of government among
citizens. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 9-6 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing
the compensation clause as an attempt to limit sacrifice by a minority of the population).
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The inconsistency in decisions of regulators and courts in their efforts to avoid a
rational standard for compensation results in bad law. Courts and regulators should use
the just and reasonable rate standard as a basis for compensation, allowing for more hon-
est and straightforward decisions. In addition, the just and reasonable rate standard will
allow the regulators to do what they do best-regulate. If they use the just and reasonable
rate standard, they could devise the best regulation for a utility instead of devising the
best regulation that will sustain a takings challenge or find a way to creatively re-invent
the law to avoid paying compensation.153
Confusion is rife as to the appropriate amount of compensation chargeable to the
users of public rights-of-way, but also as to the very authority of state and local govern-
ments to require compensation. This wasn't always the case. It has long been a well-settled
legal principle that local governments may receive reasonable rental compensation from
private commercial entities for their use of local public property for private economic
gain, even where federal statutory law restricts local governments from denying access to
rights-of-way for telecommunications services. 154
Indeed, a citywide street franchise is a special kind of contract granted by a municipali-
ty. It is a contract that gives the city's permission to a private company-a franchisee-to use
the public streets and rights-of-way for private economic gain. The franchisee pays the city
for the use of the public streets in the form of franchise fees. These franchise fees are some-
times called street rentals; they are not taxes. A franchise fee is the consideration paid for the
rights granted by the franchise, and serves as compensation for use of the public property.
The payment of franchise fees is a contractual obligation of the franchisee. 155 Not surpris-
ingly, telephone franchisees or telephone service providers have argued in the past that cities
and states violate the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution when they impose state or
local charges on interstate access fee revenue. 156
VII. Sharing the Hegemony: NAFTA & Telecom Competition.
Complementary commercial fiber-optic use on the easements of federally regulated
pipelines would ostensibly promote increased choice and lower rates for Canadian telecom
users. Not only will this be consistent with Canadian telecommunication policies, it will pro-
mote the convergence between disparate utilities, helping to redefine the telecommunications
industry in Canada. But the commercial inclusion of fiber optics on federally regulated pipeline
easements means that the NEB will, to some extent, have to share hegemony with the CRTC.
The CRTC has jurisdiction over the tariffing of fibers. In a recent case, 157 TELUS
Communications Inc. (TCI) submitted that the CRTC does not have the jurisdiction to
153. See Baynes, supra note 148, at 444.
154. See Clarence A. West, The Information Highway Must Pay Its Way Through Cities: A Discussion of
the Authority of State and Local Governments to Be Compensated for the Use of Public Rights-of-
way, 95 MICH. TEL. TECH. L. REv. 2 (1998).
155. See id. at nn. 8 & 9.
156. See id. at 18. See, e.g., St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92 (1893); Goldberg v. Sweet,
488 U.S. 252 (1989).
157. See Tariff Filings Related to the Installation of Optical Fibres Telecom Decision CRTC 97-7,
Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission Apr. 23, 1997.
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regulate its provision of optical fiber. TCI stated that it is not operating as a telecommuni-
cations common carrier when it provisions optical fiber, and that only activities under-
taken by entities acting as telecommunications common carriers are subject to a require-
ment to file general tariffs. TCI submitted that the definition of a telecommunications
common carrier requires that telecommunications service be provided to the public for
compensation. According to TCI, this criterion is not satisfied in the case of its provision-
ing of optical fiber, since it supplies unique customer-initiated requests on a case-by-case
basis and, consequently, has not provided service to the public. TCI cited cases in Canada
and the United States in support of its position. VTL disagreed with TCI's submission.
The CRTC was not persuaded by TCI's submissions regarding "service to the public:'
rejecting TCI's suggestion that when optical fiber is provided only in response to cus-
tomer-initiated requests, this does not constitute "service to the public."' 58 The CRTC
found that the provisioning of optical fiber is the provisioning of a "telecommunications
service" as defined by the Telecommunications Act.159
Such complementary commercial fiber-optic use also follows the opinio juris of
international law, which provides qualified support for the right of connection contem-
plated under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). However, the bound-
ary line between competition law 160 concerning the telecommunications industry in
Canada is being addressed on an incremental, case-by-case basis.1 6 1 Yet, at first blush,
fiber optics on pipeline easements conform with principal characteristics of competition
and telecommunications. These principal characteristics 162 include the need to intercon-
nect with the existing local network and resultant concerns over the control of bottleneck
facilities. They also include concerns growing out of the heavy subsidization of local rates
during the monopoly era, which has now been transposed into an entitlement to univer-
sal service at affordable rates.
Competition in the Canadian telecommunications market can generally be divided
into three segments: long distance (LD), local, and broadcast/cable. The LD sector con-
sists of switched LD for voice and data, data services, and mobile wireless services. The
local sector is primarily the local telephony system, which operates under a nationwide
alliance-Stentor. The broadcast and cable sectors round out the market. Competition was
introduced into the long distance sector in 1987, while full deregulation occurred in July
1994. This was when equal access to the public telephone system was implemented. The
local market was opened to competition in May 1997 without any special breaks for new
entrants and with relatively few restrictions on the incumbent regional companies.
Beginning in 1998, the barriers to open competition in all cable and broadcasting markets
were also removed, enabling telephone companies to compete in the cable-TV business.
Historically, the telephone industry allocated the costs between local exchange plant
investment and long distance on a common basis. The cross subsidy increased when long
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. The leading case on the judicially-created doctrine of regulated conduct of labour is Attorney
General of Canada v. Law Soc'y of British Columbia [19821 137 D.L.R. (3d) 1, [19821 2 S.C.R.
307.
161. See H. N. Janisch, From Monopoly Towards Competition in Telecommunications: What Role for
Competition Law?, 23 CAN. Bus. L.J. 239,243 (1997).
162. See id.
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distance transmission costs began to decline significantly due to technological advances.
In United States v. American Tel & Telco,16 3 the landmark antitrust settlement concluded
that AT&T had managed to keep out competition largely due to its control over local
exchange facilities, and that ending that control would stop competitors from being dis-
advantaged. The divested local exchange companies would not be allowed to provide long
distance service and therefore would have no incentive to discriminate between long dis-
tance carriers. 164 In Canada, there is reticence to use competition law as effectively as in
the United States. 165 The CRTC continuing its stewardship by rate balancing between
long distance and local rates, reflects the policy of the CRTC, which until recently man-
dated a steadily increasing subsidy from long distance to local facilities.166
Lower long distance prices are also being influenced internationally by NAFTA.
NAFTA expands the Canada and U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA). 167 Specific provisions
are made for telecommunications. 168 NAFTA's Chapter 13 specifically provides for
telecommunications; the objective is to "maintain and support the further development
of an open and competitive market for the provision of enhanced services and computer
services" as well as the use of "public telecommunications transport services"'1 69 NAFTA
provides that foreign resellers 170 may face restrictions on resale, but only if necessary to
safeguard the public service responsibilities of the public network operators (the telecom
companies), to protect the technical integrity of the networks and to safeguard subscriber
163. United States v. American Tel & Telco, 552 F Supp. 131, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
164. See Janisch, supra note 161, at 247.
165. See CANADIAN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY AT THE CENTENARY 427 (N.R.S. Khemani & W. T.
Standbury, eds., (1991)).
[Wjhile parliament has been prepared to amend the Competition Act from time
to time over the last century to exempt specific trades and industries - labour
unions, fishermen, amateur hockey players - no one wants to address such a fun-
damental policy issue as the degree to which this legislation applies to regulated
industries. Instead, in true Canadian fashion, a regulated industry exemption has
developed inadvertently through a series of court decisions where the issue has
nothing to do with public policy or public interest, but rather weaving through
ancient doctrines of constitution interpretation.
166. See id., citing Richard J. Schultz, Old Wine in New Bottle: The Politics of Cross-Subsidies in
Canadian Telecommunications (paper for the national conference on the future of telecommuni-
cations policy in Canada (Toronto, Apr. 1-2, 1993)).
167. Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, Can.-U.S., 27 I.L.M. 281 (entered into force
Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter U.S./Canada FTA]. Ratified by the United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (1988) (codified at
19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1988)); codified in Canada by the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act, R.S.C. 65 (1988).
168. See John D. Hylton, Free Wheeling and Dealing? - NAFTA and GATT and Telecom, 4 MEDIA &
COMM. L. REv. 173 (1996).
169. NAFTA Article 1301.3 provides that "[e]ach party shall ensure that.., persons are permitted to:.
. (b) interconnect private leased or owned circuits with public telecommunications transport
networks in the territory, or across the borders of that party."
170. See Trunk-side Access by Resellers to the Public Switched Telephone Network, Telecom Decision
CRTC 93-8 Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Comm'n. July 23, 1993 (the
Commission notes that "investment in transmission facilities in Canada, whether by resellers or
others, must comply with Canadian ownership and other requirements").
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confidentiality. 171 However, under the Canadian Telecommunications Act, if a reseller 172
is deemed to be engaged in the activity of telecommunications common carrier, then it
would be subject to regulation by the CRTC and therefore, subject to restrictions on for-
eign ownership.
The 1989 FTA reaffirmed the right of Canada to manage direct foreign investment.
This right was reaffirmed in NAFTA. Although Canada's ability to restrict or condition
U.S.-sourced FDI is circumscribed,' 73 the Investment Canada Act generally controls
review of foreign investment; yet it largely delegated its bailiwick to the CRTC for the reg-
ulated industry of telecommunications. 174 The FTA and NAFTA do not create common
markets as in the European Union.1 75 The provisions of the FTA and NAFTA concerning
foreign direct investment (FDI) are mild compared to the European Union's right of
establishment. The Canadian-U.S. version is a form of "managed FDI," which recognizes
that while FDI brings advantages to the host country there are justifications for limiting
investment access in certain circumstances. 176 Because Canadian investors effectively
enjoyed open FDI access to the United States, the United States sought to introduce an
EU-type of establishment right for U.S. firms in Canada. The United States wanted to be
released from the ambit of the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA) and its successor
Investment Canada and to be assured equal treatment with Canadian nationals with
respect to establishing and operating businesses in Canada.
Rather than a right of establishment, there is merely liberalization of existing invest-
ment limitations. Investment Canada was grandfathered into the FTA and NAFTA. This
means that U.S. investments still face controls with respect to acquisitions of sizable
Canadian firms. An asymmetry exists since Canadians largely have open access to the
United States where FDI is largely decontrolled. Investment questions were not high on
Canada's agenda, which was satisfied with the status quo.
Like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), NAFTA provides for
most-favored-nation (MFN), meaning that a party to the treaty must treat service
171. See Hylton, supra note 168, at 180. See also NAFTA, Art. 1310: Definitions. "Public
Telecommunications Transport Service" means any telecommunications transport service
required by a party, explicitly or in effect, to be offered to the public generally, including tele-
graph, telephone, telex and data transmission, that typically involves the real time transmission of
customer-supplied information between two or more points without any end-to-end change in
the form or content of customers information. Id.
172. Resale means the subsequent sale or lease on a commercial basis, with or without adding value, of
a telecommunications service leased from the Company. "Reseller" means a person engaged in
resale.
173. U.S./Canada FTA Articlel602(1) and NAFTA Article 1102(1) provide for national treatment for
investors, but this national treatment is qualified by the continuing vigor of certain "existing
measures" such as Investment Canada pursuant to FTA Article 1607 and NAFTA Article 1108(1).
Under the FTA Article 1607(3), Investment Canada was modified to raise the dollar threshold
amounts for investment review of U.S. soured investments as set forth in FTA Annex 1607.3.
174. See Jean Raby, The Investment Provisions of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement: A
Canadian Perspective, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 394,421-26 (1990).
175. See Douglas E. Rosenthal, Antitrust Implications of the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 485 (1988).
176. See Jeffrey Atik, Fairness and Managed Foreign Direct Investment, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1,
16(1994).
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providers no less favorably than it treats service providers from any non-NAFTA country.
The FTA and NAFTA exclude basic telecom services so that national monopolies can still
continue as sole providers of basic services. However, any person or corporation, such as a
reseller or enhanced service provider, has the right to access public networks. This right of
connection represents an important step in facilitating the free flow of information
between parties to the NAFTA treaty.177 NAFTA allows users in a number of states to
connect private lines with other private lines for their own persons. Typically, such con-
nection is used by corporations for internal communications of voice and data or tele-
conferencing. Service providers are empowered to perform switching, processing, and sig-
nally functions on their own without having to rely on the monopoly providers of basic
service to carry out these services for them. Providers are free to offer "enhanced
services" 178 to third parties. This reflects the fact that communication is an increasingly
important section of the economy and that the value added and resale sub-section has
become the fastest growing and one of the most profitable niches in the marketplace. 179
Under NAFTA, providers and users of telecommunications services are expressly per-
mitted to access, manipulate and move information both within their own borders and
across national borders free of restrictions. 180 The NAFTA provisions are further reflected
in the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS), reached as part of the Uruguay
round of talks on GATT. The GATS annex on telecommunications sets out minimum
standards to be implemented by member states with regard to the regulation of their
domestic telecommunications sector. The pivotal aspects include access to a host coun-
try's public telecommunications network by foreign service supplies.181
VII. Conclusion.
Like Stentor, public utilities are singular persons with attributes of many. They also
have multiple capacities that need to be accommodated in the public interest by regula-
tors. Indeed, public utilities are the administrators of the incorporeal hereditament of
way. As essential services, public utilities are charged with public purposes in the steward-
ship of their rights-of-way. However, these public purposes often conflict with private law
land rights. Until recently, it has been relatively easy to compartmentalize the traditional
user of a utility easement.
For instance, authorization of the construction of a federal pipeline, including the
route hearings, the certificate of public convenience, and enabling legislation is a legal
process tantamount to the exercise of eminent domain. Indeed, the raison d'etre of the
utility is to promote the public interest. Yet in order to be fair, the process must not be
177. See Hylton, supra note 168, at 181.
178. NAFTA Article 1310 broadly defines "enhanced services" or "value-added services" to mean
"those telecommunication services employing computer processing applications that: (a) Act on
the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects of a customer's transmitted information;
(b) Provide a customer with additional, distant, or restructured information; or (c) Involve cus-
tomer interaction with stored information!'
179. See Hylton, supra note 168, at 182.
180. See id. at 184.
181. These "rights of connections" are for the most part mirrored in NAFTA. See id. at 186.
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static; rather, it must be fair, balancing of the public interest as against the private interest
of the owner. Accordingly, the issuance of a certificate of public convenience is akin to a
form of zoning for which compensation is not payable.
No express language or judicial authority authorizes nor prohibits commercial use by a
Canadian pipeline of fiber-optic telecommunications on its right of way. Indeed, no express
words against such use exist in the easement deeds. However, such change in user of a pipeline
right-of-way (dominant tenement) is not an increased burden on the adjoining land (servient
tenement). Analogously, attaching coaxial cable on Hydro poles places a negligible resultant
burden on the land. The difference in the Hydro case 182 is that a third-party must pay a com-
mercial fee to the owner of the easement (dominant tenement). Conversely, federal pipelines
have a stewardship right over their easement permitting construction of commercial fiber-optic
telecommunication cable following the exercise of business judgment. Indeed, private property
is not a castle in isolation, it is a castle in a community and draws its support and security of
existence from the community. The law recognizes many compromises and outright intrusions
on the literal sense of this concept, including the right of eminent domain and the right of the
community in applying zoning restrictions and safety standard. 183
Typically, the grant of right-of-way to pipelines is a general grant. The right is not limited
to the pipeline use contemplated when the grant was made. More uses are permitted.
Arguably, the commercial use of fiber optics on a pipeline right-of-way does not radically alter
the character of the right-of-way, namely, that of one concerning direct and incidental
pipeline uses. This is consistent with common law principles that allow for a consideration of
the commercial setting in which the parties are operating including convergence of utilities.
From a public policy standpoint, contemporary commercial use and economic argument
supports such use by the owner of the dominant tenement who, as mentioned, is effectively
the administrator of the incorporeal hereditament of way. It would be grossly inefficient to
settle the matter with sole reference to a right-of-way action that is expensive, technical, and
often calls many witnesses. First of all, the capital costs inherent in the construction of dupli-
cate infrastructures may otherwise operate as a barrier to entry and a disincentive for the
deployment of networks essential to an information-based society. Secondly, although the
adjoining landowner(s) own the solum of the right-of-way, the right-of-way is sterilized since
their ability to use it is extremely limited. Ownership of the right-of-way solum (the land
under the right-of-way) by the servient tenement is somewhat fictional since the proprietor
has scant control over its use. In other words, a federally regulated Canadian pipeline is the
administrator of the incorporeal right-of-way for pipeline with statutory power to discharge
its duties as administrators. This expansion of stewardship is consistent with the globalization
of politics and markets, a process which one commentator 184 suggests is creating forces that
militate in favor of various forms of deregulation. "Indeed, successful government regulation
often takes its structure and form from the entities it seeks to regulate: '185 Canadian utility
regulators may therefore be lagging in a market approach, which could secure an important
public interest objective-one that is economically and politically pragmatic for network public
utilities in an era of convergence and co-location.
182. SeeOntario Hydro (F.C. 1997) (file A332-92).
183. See Regina v. Lyons [1984] 2 S.C.R. 63.
184. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., A Global Perspective on Current Regulatory Reforms: Rejection, Relocation,
or Reinvention?, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 429,439 (1995).
185. Id.
